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ABSTRACT  
Three shortcomings in existing information technology (IT) governance research are identified: an overemphasis on 
implementation rather than principles, a focus on the individual organisation rather than the relationships between 
organisations and a tendency to divorce the technology from the activities that rely on it. A governance framework comprised 
of the overarching principles of direction and control is proposed and it is suggested that these principles can be delivered 
through a focus on performance, conformance, openness and transparency, responsibility and accountability, and evaluation 
and monitoring.  The importance of outsourcing as a form of inter-organisational relationship is highlighted and three case 
studies of different types of outsourcing arrangement conducted to test the usefulness of the framework. The results suggest 
that organisations recognise the importance of effective governance to the success of their relationships, that designing 
appropriate governance for relationships is complicated by factors such as the need to accommodate the disparate 
requirements of the parties involved and that the framework proposed appears to capture the essential areas.    
Keywords  
Governance, outsourcing, direction, control 
INTRODUCTION 
IT has long been accepted as playing a strategic role in the operations of organisations (Brown, 1997) and represents a 
significant proportion of their investment expenditure (Gu et al, 2008). Yet historically IT has often been poorly managed – 
both from the perspective of initiatives failing or being abandoned and operational problems. According to the Standish 
Group (2006), for example, only 35 percent of software projects started in 2006 could be categorized as successful – defined 
in the broadest sense as being completed on time, on budget and meeting user requirements. The IT Governance Institute 
[ITGI] (2005) provide numerous examples of the impact of shortcomings in the design and use of  IT, including IBM 
suffering a 16% decline in its share prices due to component shortages caused by problems in the exchange of information 
with trading partners. 
Given the significance of IT, and the problems associated with it, academics and practitioners alike have been arguing for a 
number of years that performance could be improved by implementing a dedicated governance structure for IT (Watson and 
Brancheau, 1991; Weill and Ross, 2004; Gu et al 2008). Weill and Woodham (2002) suggested that effective IT governance 
was fundamental in helping State Street maximise the business value from its IT investments and average annual net income 
growth in excess of 19%.   
This paper suggests though that much of the academic work to date on IT governance has been limited through being focused 
on:  
• the technology divorced from the activities that rely on it  
• how to implement governance structures rather than the principles they should embody 
• governance within an organisation rather than also considering governance between organisations   
As such it is suggested that there may be much to gain from an extension of emphasis. To assist in this process the paper will 
seek to identify a set of appropriate principles for the effective governance of IT enabled activities in an inter-organisational 
context.  
The remainder of the paper consists of four main sections. First is a discussion of governance and a suggestion that previous 
research has overly focused on how IT governance should be implemented rather than seeking to better understand the 
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underlying principles of direction and control.   Second is an attempt to define the components of direction and control. Third 
it is argued that it is necessary to extend considerations of IT governance beyond the boundaries of a single organisation and 
include the activities that make use of the technology – and that this makes an examination of IT governance in an 
outsourcing context pertinent. Fourth are the results of a series of case studies designed to test whether the principles and 
components identified can provide guidance for the effective governance of different types of outsourcing arrangement.  
IT GOVERNANCE 
IT governance is commonly seen as being derived from corporate governance (Webb et al, 2006). A useful overarching view 
of corporate governance is provided by Keasey and Wright (1993) who consider it to be a framework for the effective 
regulation, monitoring and control of companies which allows for alternative internal and external mechanisms for achieving 
the underlying objectives.  The Cadbury Committtee (1992) similarly considers corporate governance to be “the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled” (p15). There appears to be a broad consensus that IT governance is similarly 
concerned with direction and control. Weill and Ross (2004), for example, define IT governance as “specifying the decision 
rights and accountability framework to encourage desirable behaviour in the use of IT” (p2). AS8015, the Australian 
Standard for the corporate governance of ICT, defines it as “the system by which the current and future use of ICT is directed 
and controlled” (Standards Australia, 2005, p6).  
Previous research on  IT governance has largely focused not on enhancing understanding of those principles of direction and 
control but on their  implementation1. Tavakolian (1989), Brown (1997) and  Sia et al (2008), for example, examined IT 
decision making and influences on whether it was centralised or decentralised. Sambamurthy and Zmud (1999) identified 3 
prevalent modes – centralised, decentralised and federal –  while Weill and Ross (2004) proposed six archetypes – business 
monarchy, IT monarchy, feudal, federal, IT duopoly and anarchy. Weill and Ross (2004) also identified specific areas that IT 
governance should cover; namely, principles, architecture, infrastructure, business applications and investment priorities. 
Gerrard (2006) looked at IT governance from the perspective of the IT life cycle – specifically strategy, planning, 
implementation, management and monitoring. While potentially useful there is a danger that concentrating on 
implementation not only assumes a common understanding of what effective direction and control mean but also risks being 
prescriptive by requiring management to view and run the business in a specific way.  Indeed Davies (1999), Broadbent 
(2003) and others, have suggested that the goal of IT governance should be to establish an organisation’s objectives and the 
rules and conventions that should be followed in achieving them rather than to dictate specific actions to be taken – that being 
the role of management.  
DEFINING DIRECTION AND CONTROL 
A number of authors have sought to identify the components that contribute to the principles of direction and control.  Davies 
(1999) and Gray (2004) suggest that direction is concerned with guiding the organisation with respect to the particular 
mission it is established to achieve by establishing appropriate performance metrics.  From an IT perspective, Webb et al 
(2006) and Barrett (2000) similarly emphasise the role of alignment and performance management.  Pultorak (2006) though 
has argued that it is necessary to look beyond pure performance to also embrace conformance – with financial and legal 
requirements, health and safety obligations, quality certifications and ratings and professional codes of conduct.  
Turning to control and drawing upon and synthesising work by the Financial Reporting Council (2008), Cadbury Committee 
(1992), Davies (1999) and Gray (2004) responsibility and accountability, openness and transparency, evaluation and 
monitoring would appear to be broadly agreed upon foundations.  While other literature, especially in the IT domain (IT 
Governance Institute, 2005; Barrett, 2000; Webb et al, 2006; Weill and Ross, 2004), suggests that risk management might 
represent a useful addition it is proposed here that it can be subsumed within evaluation and monitoring. Figure 1 represents a 
summary of the essential components of direction and control. It should of course be remembered that the context of an 
organisation will influence how these principles and components are translated into practice (Sia et al, 2008; Brown, 1997). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The same is true to a degree with corporate governance also. The Cadbury committee (1992), for example, focused on how company board should be 
constructed and made more effective rather than its purpose 
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Figure 1: The principles and components of IT governance 
 
EXTENDING THE GOVERNANCE SCOPE 
The ITGI (2005) recognises that governance matters and concerns are not necessarily constrained to the boundaries of a 
single organisation noting that  the “boundaries of today’s organizations are more flexible and dynamic .. they [organizations] 
must start focusing on whole processes, including those that transcend the physical walls of the entity.. such organizational 
structure is often referred to as the extended enterprise” (p1) . The ITGI (2005) also acknowledges that governance becomes 
more complex and challenging when one moves beyond those physical walls – “In the extended enterprise environment there 
is no standard pre-existing governance structure” (p67).  
It is also now widely recognised that it is not IT per se that is of value to organisations but how it is used and contributes to 
the achievement of business objectives. Lee (2001), for example, in a discussion of the productivity paradox recognises the 
impact of the organisational context while Sabherwal et al. (2001) stress the importance of aligning an organisation’s IT with 
its business operations. Mukhopadhyay et al (1995) suggest that to understand the contribution of IT one needs to look at 
how it changes the way organisations conduct their business. As such it may be necessary to extend the scope of IT 
governance.  
One popular way in which organisations have sought to reshape themselves and change which side of the organisational 
boundary activities sit on has been through outsourcing. Outsourcing is well recognised as a means through which 
organisations can work with long-term partners to enhance capabilities or cut costs (Dibbern et al, 2004). According to 
Willcocks et al (2007) annual global revenues from IT outsourcing alone exceeded US$200 billion in 2005. Furthermore, and 
of particular interest from the perspective of this paper, is that while initial research on outsourcing focused solely on the 
technology (Dibbern et al., 2004) it has subsequently recognised the need to embrace the business processes that make use of 
that technology.  Technology Partners (2004), for example, suggested that  business process outsourcing  and IT outsourcing 
will be bundled with “the business process ruling the decision making” (p1).   
There is however only limited research on the governance of outsourcing  relationships – and that which does exist has 
typically focused on the appropriateness of the contract negotiated between the participants (see for example Fitzgerald and 
Willcocks, 1994). Willcocks et al (2007) identify various types of contracts – classifying them as standard, detailed, loose 
and mixed – and consider them in terms of the time to negotiate,  the clauses included – for example relating to costs, 
confidentiality, service level agreements and early termination – and the success of the ensuing outsourcing relationship. 
Kern and Willcocks (2000) go so far as presenting a list of contract inclusions. It is suggested here that the focus on contracts 
puts “the cart before the horse”. Williamson (2005) argued that the object of contract is not to be legalistic but to get the job 
done – and it is therefore necessary to identify what is required for that.  Hart (1995) also suggested that where there are 
problems of agency2 contracts may not always be sufficient to address them thus requiring the establishment of effective 
                                                          
2
 Agency problems arise where there are potential conflicts of interest between contracting parties that can impact on achieving a stated 
goal   
Governance
Control:
• Openness & transparency
• Responsibility & accountability
• Evaluation & monitoring
Direction:
• Performance
• Conformance
Performance – Agreeing the principal goals of the 
relationship  
Conformance – Satisfying requirements of regulators and 
other bodies
Openness & transparency – Providing quality information and effective 
reporting
Responsibility & accountability – Allocating decision rights and the 
associated liability 
Evaluation & monitoring – Assessing current activities and new 
opportunities
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corporate governance. Maher and Andersson (2000) have argued that effective corporate governance encourages the pursuit 
of group rather than individual interests – which is critical to outsourcing where both partners need to benefit for the 
relationship to succeed (Willcocks et al, 2002). Brennan and Buchanan (1985) state that rules influence outcomes and that it 
therefore follows that the study of rules and their construction – as embodied for example in governance structures – is 
critical to understanding success.  Taken together it would appear that the current focus on contracts may be inadequate. It is 
proposed here that the focus should be pushed back to examine the principles of governance which inform and support any 
contract. In practical terms the importance of the effective governance of outsourcing relationships is illustrated by the case 
of Satyam, the Indian outsourcing organisation, which provided mission critical applications to many  major organisations – 
such as Qantas, Telstra, Caterpillar and Coca-Cola – and allegedly engaged in undetected fraudulent activity over a number 
of years. Satyam’s customers now find themselves in the unenviable position of potentially having to change suppliers – with 
all the associated costs – while more broadly re-evaluating their fundamental approach to the construction and governance of 
outsourcing arrangements (Sharma and Foo, 2009). 
METHODOLOGY 
Given that little research has been conducted on the principles of governance, especially within an inter-organisational 
context, a case study based approach was determined to be appropriate (Benbasat et al, 1987).  A multi-case approach was 
taken for the study. While the cases do not, by any means cover all possible sourcing arrangements, they do capture a range 
which will provide some insight regarding whether the principles, and associated components, of good  governance are 
consistent across contexts. The cases were drawn from the private and public sectors (with one cutting across both) – details 
are provided in Figure 2. In all cases the relationship was perceived as successful by both the supplier and the client. 
Interviews were conducted with both the service provider and client and were between one and two hours in duration. A 
semi-structured interview protocol was followed to introduce a degree of commonality while minimising the potential for 
overlooking the unique aspects of each context (Firestone and Herriott, 1982). While the underlying rationale of the empirical 
research was purposeful it was deliberately non-directive so as not to preclude the emergence of factors or components not 
previously considered (Eisenharrdt, 1989). With regard to analysis, data was first reviewed and coded in terms of its 
relationship to the principles of governance and their components – an approach in accord with the recommendations of 
Miles and Huberman (1994) and Yin (1981) who suggest organising data “around the substantial topics of the case study” 
(Yin, 1981, p60). At the same time a case comparison approach underlay the analysis (Yin, 1981). The resultant data display 
tables represent a crucial link in the chain of evidence between the raw data and the subsequent analysis and development of 
conclusions. 
Figure 2: Case and interviewee details 
RESULTS 
All of the interviewees recognised the importance of IT governance – and the time and effort required to agree the principles 
and elements at the commencement of a relationship. 
Case Type Supplier Interviewees Client Interviewees 
CASE 
ONE  
Traditional 
outsourcing – where 
an organisation 
outsources one or 
more activities to an 
external provider 
SUPPLIER1 - Local 
subsidiary of a 
multinational provider  
Senior VP Business 
Development & 
Marketing (BDM)  
Regional Account 
Manager (RAM) 
CLIENT1 - A major 
provider of 
telecommunications 
with operations in 
Australia & overseas 
National Manager 
Customer Services 
(MCS) 
Outsourced Services 
Relationship Manager 
(SRM) 
CASE 
TWO  
Where an 
organisation enters 
into a joint venture 
with a provider to 
supply one or more 
services to itself and 
to others 
SUPPLIER2 – 
Australian listed 
provider of business 
services  
Partnership director 
(PD) 
Project Manager 
(PM) 
CLIENT2 – A local 
council  
General Manager 
(GM) 
 
Finance Director (FD) 
CASE 
THREE 
Where several 
organisations together 
establish a separate 
vehicle to provide 
services to all of them 
SUPPLIER 3 – 
captive provider 
wholly owned by its 
clients 
General Manager 
(GM) 
Chief Information 
Officer (CIO) 
CLIENT3 – A state 
based financial 
services provider 
 
General Manager 
(GM) 
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“We have as a business an overriding set of principles that we apply”CLIENT1-SRM 
“So the first 12 months – well there’s been two years of negotiations [to get the governance right]”SUPPLIER2-PD 
“establishing the driving principles .. rather than just going through a straight kind of contractual 
arrangement”CLIENT3-GM 
It was also recognised that the implementation of governance will vary according to specific circumstances – such as an 
organisation’s overarching purpose and role, the mix of the organisations involved in a relationship (for example whether it 
cuts across the boundary between the public and private sectors), and whether a separate company is established to house the 
activities. 
“have to work within council’s parameters”CLIENT2-GM 
“a lot of work went into the constitution [of the partnership vehicle] .. establishing rights and 
responsibilities”SUPPLIER3-GM 
Recognition of the significance of governance however does not lead to a neglect of the importance of contracts – though it 
can lead to a change in role. Interviewees recognised the necessity of having an appropriate contract in place – but often more 
to document the underlying principles to an arrangement or as a backstop than as the defining feature or driver of a 
relationship.  
“the contract discussions for that were difficult, prolonged. But it goes to a point and why they were difficult and 
prolonged because we never wanted the contracts to drive the relationship. But we needed all the protections in 
there” CLIENT2-FD 
“So it took a long time to get a contract that actually did all those things, but allowed us to actually function in a 
fashion” SUPPLIER3-GM 
The complexity of inter-organisational governance was highlighted, especially the difficulty of managing multiple – perhaps 
overlapping or conflicting – governance structures. 
“We’ve got a couple of governance structures that work and sometimes don’t work and sometimes conflict with each 
other. So it is a bit of an interesting dilemma.”CLIENT2-GM 
The importance of clearly making the distinction between governance and management was also recognised 
“Don’t look in the rear vision mirror at us, we know what we’re about.  So stop micro-managing us, let us get 
on.”SUPPLIER3-CIO 
 
Governance component Requirements Inter-organisational complications 
Clarity Performance 
Metrics 
Competing 
Capture all requirements 
Structures and ethos 
Conformance 
Change management 
Different jurisdictions and requirements 
Warts and all Openness & Transparency 
Multiple level 
 
Clear allocation 
Remedies 
Responsibility & accountability 
Future 
Hands off 
Regular 
Detailed 
Evaluation & monitoring 
Independent 
Who to sue 
Figure 3: Requirements for governance and potential inter-organisational complications 
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Evidence from interviews suggests that the components identified are relevant and together constitute a cohesive framework. 
As illustrated by Figure 3 the cases also both provide some details regarding the requirements of each governance component 
and identify some potential obstacles or complications for inter-organisational contexts. The elements of the governance 
framework are reported on individually below. 
Performance 
Clearly defining the objectives of the relationship and developing metrics for expected performance were seen as important.  
“clear agreement on what are the outcomes that you’re trying to deliver from the arrangement…getting the metrics 
on the table” SUPPLIER2-GM 
“control the strategic sort of direction.. through performance management”SUPPLIER1-BDM 
“for any partnership to work, there needs to be an impact, so there needs to be something that is 
measurable”CLIENT2-GM 
The difficulty though of ensuring that the metrics were objective or “real” and not open to manipulation was also 
acknowledged. 
“Price is better than cost because it is more real .. costs you can change what you include or how you allocate. 
Prices are transparent and verifiable and benchmarkable”   SUPPLIER3-GM 
Conformance 
The importance of conforming with required obligations – such as regulation or legislation –  was recognised along with the 
recognition that it is as much about putting in place an ethos of compliance, the principles for its management and the 
enabling – or enforcing – structures, as meeting specific, current requirements given that these are continuously changing and 
evolving.  
“There’s a big compliance burden now.  .. need to pick up all the changes in legislation and making sure that we're 
implementing it through all of our policies and processes” CLIENT3-GM 
“Complex.. but work from the basis that compliance is critical and you have to put everything necessary in place to 
achieve it.. can not dictate though because too much variation and change” CLIENT2-FD 
“Made sure have the necessary compliance structures in place”CLIENT1-SRM 
The complexity was compounded when participants to an arrangement operated under different compliance regimes; with the 
principal difference remarked upon being between the public and private sectors. 
“the complexity of these three different creatures coming together in a sort of fashion, with all these different tax 
requirements and legal reporting requirements and everything like that, really meant that we had to develop this very 
complex sort of structure”SUPPLIER2-PD 
Openness & transparency 
It was recognised that for a relationship to work effectively it was necessary to ensure that information flowed around all the 
organisations involved. 
“So from a communication perspective it’s absolutely fundamentally critical that we maintain that communication 
across all of our stakeholder groups.”  SUPPLIER2-PM 
“warts and all and deal with the bullets”CLIENT1-SRM 
The emphasis was as on putting in place principles and structures that facilitated communications (while clearly 
understanding the role of that communication). 
“Multiple forums and structures that facilitate communication between at  different levels”SUPPLIER2-PD 
“you’ve really got to understand what it is that you’re trying to achieve and that’s got to be able to be articulated by 
both parties and more importantly, right down to the people who are delivering the service.. we have an open book 
policy right through the organisations and with clients” SUPPLIER1-BDM 
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Responsibility & accountability 
Interviewees commented on the need to clearly establish who does what within a service arrangement and ensure that they 
are held accountable for delivery to the agreed standard.  
“Needed to establish contracting that makes it very clear who was responsible for what”CLIENT2-GM 
It was also emphasised that clients need to understand that they retain a role – that they can not simple hand over an activity 
to another – since there will remain dependencies and the provider will require support – for example the efficient and 
effective processing of a payroll depends in part upon the quality of the inputs received.  
“Because to some degree, they might want to be more hands-off, because they don’t want to take responsibility. 
You’re the experts. You do it. You take responsibility for it”SUPPLIER2-PD 
Furthermore it was suggested that the arrangements needed to formally address what would be done when problems were 
identified.   
“Have to be able to accommodate problems and disagreements without dragging everything to a screaming 
halt”CLIENT3-GM 
“Clear set of SLAs with very clear remedies”CLIENT1-SRM 
Finally interviewees argued that at the outset attention should be paid to how future developments would be accommodated 
to avoid potential problems emerging. For example, one interviewee commented that while issues relating to the current 
technology platform had been addressed – such as agreeing the quality of service to be provided and who was responsible – 
little attention had been paid to who had the authority to upgrade it. 
“quite vague .. could in the future create problems.. I think the answer to that is, yes there will have to be 
discussion” SUPPLIER2-PD 
Evaluation & monitoring 
Interviewees had put in place processes and structures that enabled them to monitor and evaluate current activities and new 
initiatives.  
“We’ve got a quite stringent reporting system, probably more than most.  We get quite in-depth reporting on a 
monthly basis about anything and everything.” SUPPLIER3-GM 
“There is regular reporting put in place and there are  triggers for review, escalations if there are 
issues”SUPPLIER2-PM 
“we have a process in place for us to look at new opportunities and decide if they can be accommodated within our 
current relationship” SUPPLIER2-PD 
The value of independent third party evaluation was also noted 
“We get KPMG to come in and do an independent audit of our systems” SUPPLIER3-GM 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results suggest that the current focus in the literature on how governance structures should be implemented, for example 
the degree of centralisation versus decentralisation, should be extended to give greater consideration to identifying the 
principles of governance.  From a specifically inter-organisational perspective, the cases highlight both the importance of the 
governance of those relationships and the need to look beyond the construction of effective contracts. The cases also 
highlight the complexity of governance in an inter-organisational context – including the difficulty of constructing a 
governance structure where there are different perspectives and requirements and which may include the creation of a 
separate legal entity.  Furthermore the research – through its inclusion of activities as well as technology – calls into question 
the historical restrictive emphasis on IT governance and suggests that perhaps the focus should be more broadly on 
operational governance – as compared to the financial governance that lies at the core of corporate governance.   
Turning to the specific governance framework developed, this would appear to form a useful starting point for research in the 
area – with all of the interviewees accepting their relevance and significance of the principles and components. The fact that 
cases were constructed across a variety of sourcing arrangements also suggests that the basics of good governance may be 
somewhat generic.  
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The research conducted though clearly has a number of shortcomings that need to be rectified in future studies. All of the 
cases examined considered themselves to be successful. Only if unsuccessful cases are studied as well will it be possible to 
determine whether and how effective governance contributes to success. It is not possible from the current analysis to 
determine if the principles and components identified are necessary and sufficient – are all of them required? Are there others 
currently missing? The definitions used also need to be refined to remove the potential for overlap – is openness and 
transparency necessary as a separate element or should it be subsumed within evaluation and monitoring.  Finally, 
identifying the principles for  effective inter-organisational governance is only useful if it is then followed up with a guide as 
to how to put them into practice ie the research should supplement rather than replace that on implementation.. 
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